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  IAbstract 
This article contributes to the literature on innovation and development by identifying the 
determinants of innovation, and the role of intellectual property rights, in industrialized and 
developing countries. Controlling for sample selection, I find that, in general, the level of 
intellectual property protection and a country’s technological capital stock are positively re-
lated to research and development investments, while openness to trade has a negative effect. 
I also find the determinants of innovation to be different for industrialized and developing 
countries. This is supported by endogeneity tests showing that intellectual property protection 
is endogenous in industrialized countries, but not in developing countries. However, in both 
sub-samples, research and development investments Granger-cause intellectual property pro-
tection levels, whereas surprisingly, intellectual property protection does not Granger-cause 
research and development investments. 
Keywords: Innovation; intellectual property rights; developing countries; panel data; selec-
tion model. 
JEL Classification: O30; O34; C23 
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1 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
In industrialized countries, intellectual property rights (IPRs) are part of the infrastructure 
supporting investments in research and development (R&D) leading to innovation. Theoreti-
cally, the temporary exclusive rights on inventions granted to inventors allow them to price 
their products above marginal cost, and hence recoup their initial research investment. Such 
exclusive right creates incentives for the conduct of R&D. However, by granting monopoly 
rights on an invention, IPRs impede its dissemination. The resulting underprovision of pro-
tected goods and monopoly distortions are considered acceptable costs for the creation of new 
knowledge and the increase in social welfare that it entails.  
However, growing numbers of experts question these affirmations for developing countries 
(LDCs) and argue that IPRs “do little to stimulate innovation in developing countries” (CIPR, 
2002, p. 1). In practice, the standards of education and innovative ability vary among coun-
tries, thus making some countries not only more capable of innovating but also facilitating 
absorption from transfers and spillovers. The development of innovative capacity is based on 
past performance of R&D, which enhances the firm’s ability to assimilate and exploit existing 
information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Many LDCs have low innovative capabilities and 
are dependent on industrialized countries for the provision of new technology and knowledge 
(Aubert, 2005). Hence IPRs may provide incentives for innovation but there is limited local 
technological capacity to react to these incentives.  
The institutional environment in LDCs is often characterized by the presence of high transac-
tion costs, which often include corruption (Collier, 1998), and by weak institutions (Stiglitz, 
1989). In some countries, the importance of transaction costs might be high enough to hamper 
the incentive effect (Léger, 2005), and the quality of the institutions, especially the legal sys-
tem, directly affects the effectiveness of IPRs.  
Still, IPRs are an important issue in bilateral, regional and multilateral trade negotiations. 
Pressure is put on LDCs to sign up for stronger standards of IP protection without having a 
clear picture of the impacts IPRs have on innovation in these economies (Fink and Maskus, 
2005).  
This study hence investigates the role of IPRs for innovation and contributes to the literature 
on innovation and development by identifying the determinants of innovation, and the role of 
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IPRs, in industrialized and developing countries. I use previous static models (Kanwar and 
Evenson, 2003) as a basis and then extend these estimations to control for the quality of the 
institutional environment and past R&D activities.  
Controlling for sample selection, I find that in the full sample, the level of intellectual prop-
erty protection and a country’s technological capital stock are positive and significant regres-
sors explaining R&D investments, while openness to trade has a negative effect. I also find 
the determinants of innovation to be different for industrialized and developing countries. 
This is supported by the endogeneity tests that show that intellectual property protection is 
endogenous in industrialized countries, but not in developing countries. However, in both 
sub-samples, research and development investments Granger-cause IP protection levels but 
surprisingly, IP protection does not Granger-cause research and development investments. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on IPRs and innovation. Section 3 presents the data used, section 4 discusses the 
estimation procedures and their results, that are analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Innovation 
2.1  Nature and determinants 
Past models of innovation presented innovation as a linear phenomenon (see figure 1).  How-
ever, such models, in which innovation is either seen as exogenous and driven solely by sci-
entific advances, or conversely as responding only to demand for new products and processes, 
did not survive empirical scrutiny.  
Both demand-pull and technology-push factors play a role for innovation but they are interre-
lated (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Innovation can be motivated by increased profits or mar-
ket share, secured by IPRs or other mechanisms (e.g., first-mover advantage, secrecy) which 
motivates investments in innovative activity, or react to “demand-pull” factors (Schmookler, 
1972), i.e., the perceived demand for new products and processes. Conversely, “technology-
push” factors, where advancements in technology and science allow for the development of 
new products and processes also play an important role (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). 
The environment in which a firm operates affects its innovative performance. At the macro-
economic level, economic and political stability (Lall, 1992) provides an environment suppor-
  2Discussion Papers   696 
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tive of innovation. International competition and openness to trade also affect incentives to 
innovate, however these impacts can vary (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). At the firm level, 
given that R&D is an expensive endeavor, cost of, and access to capital are important aspects. 
Finally, qualified scientists and workers are essential inputs into the innovation process, there-
fore the level of human capital in a country is another important factor (Crespo et al., 2004). 
 









Basic science  Applied sci-
ence and tech-
Manufacturing Marketing 




Source: Granstrand (1999) 
 
Though innovation could theoretically play a crucial role for economic development in LDCs 
(Commission for Africa, 2005; UN Millennium Project, 2005), most of the literature so far 
has focused on industrialized countries – except for North-South models, where the differ-
ences are explicitly taken into account.1 However, a different treatment could be warranted 
given that LDC characteristics differ from common assumptions. Demand-pull factors could 
have a limited impact in LDCs: given the low level of economic development and the unequal 
distribution of income, the effective domestic demand is usually small2 (Foellmi and 
Zweimüller, 2006). The demand side is often neglected but the expansion of domestic de-
mand is critical for economic growth, and for the performance of innovation addressing local 
needs (UNCTAD, 2006). As was already mentioned, markets are often incomplete, weak or 
non-existent (Lall, 1995) which has important implications for the conduct of innovative 
activities, especially in areas such as capital (financial and human) and information. The insti-
                                                                          
1 See among others Chin and Grossman (1990), Deardorff (1992), Helpman (1993), Zigic (1998). 
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tutional environment is characterized by the presence of high transaction costs and by weak 
institutions, which affect the functioning of the market. Finally, the performance of IPRs, a 
market-based tool, in malfunctioning markets, is still underresearched. 
2.2 Empirical  Evidence 
A few studies examine the link between IP protection and innovation for panels of countries. 
Alfranca and Huffman (2003) use a panel of European countries to estimate the effects of 
economic incentives and institutions on private innovation in agriculture, and find the level of 
IP protection, institutional quality, economic openness and the lagged value of agricultural 
production to be positive and significant factors. Conversely, the cost of capital and the 
lagged value of crop production have (significant) negative impacts.  
Kanwar and Evenson (2003) investigate the determinants of innovation and technological 
change, proxied by total R&D investments as a proportion of GNP, in a sample of industrial-
ized and developing countries. They obtain similar results: IP protection, credit availability, 
demand-pull factors, trade openness and human capital positively affect innovation, while 
political instability and interest rate have a negative effect. Varsakelis (2001) also concludes 
that IP strength is an important determinant of R&D intensity but neither him nor Kanwar and 
Evenson consider the impact of past innovative activity.  
This is done by Lederman and Maloney (2003), who use a dynamic GMM system estimator. 
They find that interest rate and risk negatively affect aggregate private and public R&D in-
vestments, while past R&D investments, credit market depth, IP protection, and the quality of 
research institutions are positive and significant explanatory factors. However, GMM estima-
tors rely on asymptotic properties, hence estimates can be biased for small samples like 
theirs.3 They also do not control for the quality of institutions, which could be captured by 
the IP index, nor for the level of development of the countries. Finally, they choose to esti-
mate certain variables and not others in logarithmic form, violating the assumptions on the 
distribution of their regressors (e.g., estimating most variables in levels but the IP index in 
logarithmic form). 
                                                                          
2 Obvious exceptions are large countries such as India, China and Brazil. 
3 It is not clear from the paper if the authors use the correction for small samples developed by Windmeijer 
(2005). 
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A recent article (Higino Schneider, 2005) investigates the role of trade, FDI and IPRs in ex-
plaining innovation. It finds that the coefficient of the IP index is significant and positive for 
the whole sample and the sub-sample of industrialized countries, while it is negative and not 
significant for the LDC sub-sample. Contrary to the other studies, the number of patent appli-
cations in the US is used as a proxy for innovation. Patenting activity might be closely related 
to the export structure of the economy (Blind et al., 2006), which is not controlled for. Fi-
nally, past innovative activity is not taken into account. Another study, looking at innovation 
in five East Asian countries (Hu and Mathews, 2005) also finds the role of IPRs on innovation 
to be negative and rather to be linked to the existing stock of patents, the levels of R&D man-
power, of R&D expenditures by the private sector, and to industrial specialization.  
2.3 Hypotheses 
The impact of IPRs on innovation in LDCs is theoretically not clear, and the empirical evi-
dence available indicates that it might be different for industrialized and developing countries. 
This paper hence tests the propositions that: 
-  IP protection is a significant factor affecting innovation; 
-  The determinants of innovation are different for developing and industrialized coun-
tries. 
The estimations tackle issues that have been either ignored or inadequately addressed in pre-
vious empirical studies, namely the impact of the quality of institutions and the importance of 
past innovative activity, and missing observations. These aspects are discussed in the next 
sections. 
3 Data 
I built a panel dataset comprising 22 industrialized and 76 developing countries. The data 
have been obtained from several sources (UNESCO, World Development Indicators, etc., see 
table 1) as well as from local statistical offices. The availability of data is problematic, espe-
cially for LDCs:  several countries are altogether absent from the sample, and data points are 
also missing. This issue is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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The dataset uses average annual data for seven 5-year sub-periods (1965-1995). Table 1 pre-
sents the variables considered in the estimations, along with the expected signs of the parame-
ters, and their sources.  





Dependent variable     
Innovation  
 
  RDGDP: Total R&D expenditures as a 
proportion of GDP (5-year average) 
UNESCO statistical yearbooks 














ΔGDPPC: ratio (GDPt/GDPt-1) of gross 
domestic product per capita (constant 
2000 US$)  
POP: Population (latest year) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (World Bank, 2005) 
IP protection  +/-  IP: Index of IP protection    Park and Ginarte (1997), Park 
(2002) 
Access to capital  +   LAG_SAV: Saving as a proportion of 
GDP (lagged one period) 
 WDI (2005) 




 INTRATE: Real interest rate  
EDU: Years of schooling, above 15 
 WDI (2005) 
Barro-Lee data set (2000)  
Macroeconomic 
instability 
-   INF: Inflation    WDI 2005 
Political instability  -   POL: State failure events dummy  Constructed from State failure  





 OPEN: Openness to trade  
 INS: Index of the quality of institutions  
 Penn World Table 6.1(2002) 
Fraser Institute (2005) 
 
Innovative effort is proxied by total R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP. IPRs are 
expected to provide incentives for private R&D, but the classification of R&D tends to be 
between productive and non-productive sectors, and these series are not stable over time. Data 
on private R&D are in general not available for LDCs, hence working with aggregate R&D 
expenditures allows including more LDCs in the sample4. This could cause the coefficient of 
the IP protection index to be biased. Furthermore, errors in measurement could also bias the 
estimation coefficients, it is hence difficult to determine the direction of the bias. 
The importance of past innovative activity is represented by the capital stocks of past R&D 
investments. The capital stock variable is built using a depreciation rate of 15%, which is 
                                                                          
4 One must also acknowledge that a high proportion of R&D taking place in LDCs is conducted by the public 
sector. 
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consistent with other empirical studies in the literature.5 The demand-pull factors are ac-
counted for by the ratio of current to lagged GDP per capita,6 to capture the change in de-
mand. Another possibility would be to include the lagged dependent variable as a regressor to 
estimate a dynamic model. However, past R&D investments over several periods are poten-
tially important to explain current innovative activity, and not only investments that occurred 
in the last period, hence using the technological capital stock appears more sensible. More-
over, the results of dynamic estimations with missing observations are not reliable; hence this 
model is not used here. 
Intellectual property protection is proxied by a time-varying index that covers 5 categories of 
patent law: extent of coverage, membership in international agreements, provisions for loss of 
protection, enforcement mechanisms and the duration of protection7 (see Park and Ginarte, 
1997).  
Important inputs in the innovation process are financial and human capital, that are accounted 
for by savings as a proportion of GDP (lagged one period) and the average years of schooling 
in the adult population, respectively. The cost of capital (deposit interest rate) is also used as a 
regressor. I use inflation and a state failure dummy to account for macroeconomic and politi-
cal instability, as these are likely to negatively affect the conduct of innovation. Finally, other 
control variables are the level of openness to trade, whose theoretical effect is unclear, and the 
quality of the institutions, as represented by the index of economic freedom (Area 2: legal 
structure and security of property rights) of the Fraser Institute. 
Estimations are performed on three sub-samples: industrialized countries, developing coun-
tries and the whole sample (see table 2). Least-developed countries are underrepresented in 
this dataset: data are not available for the periods covered, which could affect the representa-
tivity of the sample – these issues are discussed in more detail in the next section. Table 3 
presents the summary statistics. 
From this table, it is clear that industrialized and developing countries are different: the means 
are significantly different for the two sub-samples for most variables. The exception is the 
variable interest rate, where the standard deviation for LDCs is so large that the mean of the 
                                                                          
5 Recent articles (Bitzer, 2005; Bitzer and Stephan, 2007) develop a Schumpeter-inspired approach to the con-
struction of R&D capital stocks but it seems more appropriate when working with industry-level data. 
6 All variables are estimates in natural logs, hence this variable represents the difference in logs. 
7 I would like to thank Walter Park for kindly making his dataset available. 
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industrialized country sub-sample is included in it. This supports the need to consider these 
two sub-samples separately in the estimations. 
4 Estimations 
4.1   Basic Estimations 
I start by estimating a static model similar to that of Kanwar and Evenson (2003), which does 
not take prior innovative activity into account. Based on the review of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence (see section 2) I derive the following estimation model 
RD = f(ΔGDPPCt, POPt, IPt, SAVt-1, INTRATEt, EDUt, INFt, POLt, OPENt)    (1) 
Country panel datasets usually use fixed effects models, in which country individual effects, 
often unobservable and assumed constant over time, are estimated. The unobserved country 
characteristics are assumed to be correlated with the error term, which, if ignored, leads to 
biased estimates.  However, results of Hausman specification tests8 for the full sample do not 
lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficients estimated by the efficient random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator). 
Hence, the equations are estimated using random effects, since this estimator is more effi-
cient.  
                                                                          
8 The Hausman test assumes homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation in the residuals. The Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data found no first-order correlation, while performing the Breusch-Pagan test leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of constant variance in the sample. I hence perform robust estimations.  
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GDP per capita 
< 600$  
(23) 
600$ < GDP per 
capita <1 000$ 
(12) 
1 000$ < GDP per 
capita 
< 1 600$ (8) 
1 600$ < GDP per 
capita  
< 3 000$ (12) 
 
3 000$ < GDP per 
capita  
< 5 000$ 
(10) 
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Table 2 Countries 
Note: GDP per capita in 2000 constant US dollars, ranking based on 1995 figures. 
 








  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
R&D investments as a proportion of 
GDP (%) ** 
0.093  0.326 1.450 0.749 0.696 0.874 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) **  1 841  2 727  15 291  6 865  4 814  6 882 
IP protection index ** (0<IP<7)  2.259  0.617 3.201 0.659 2.462 0.736 
Saving as proportion of GDP (%)  **  17.334 10.730  24.259 5.253 18.749  10,246 
Real interest rate  169.45  2 105  7.848  5.072  127.09  1809 
Years of schooling, adult population  **  3.608  2.058 7.897 2.104 4.690 2.784 
Inflation  rate  **  48.50  293.35 7.612  6.631 38.771  256.635 
Openness to trade (%GDP) **  
Institutional quality (0<INS<7) ** 



















Table 3 Summary Statistics 
 
Note: ** means of developing and industrialized countries significantly different at the 5% level 
 
The econometric model estimated is  
  ,   i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T          (2) 
with    and  . The   are assumed independent of   and  , which 
are also independent of each other for all i and all t.   refers to R&D investments as a pro-
portion of GDP for country i at time t, and   is a vector of k regressors for the country i at 
time t. All variables are taken in logs, except for the dummy variable of political failure, and 
the equations are estimated using Stata 9. Table 4 presents the results of these estimations. 
The results of the static estimations (Model (1)) using the full sample are similar to those 
obtained by Kanwar and Evenson: IP protection and the level of education are positive and 
significant, however in their estimations the availability of financial capital in the previous 
period (LAG_SAV) is positive and significant, which is not the case here. Kanwar and Even-
son however use a dummy variable to account for the openness of the economy (the black 
market premium) which is not significant in their estimations, while the openness of the 
economy is here negative and significant at the 1% level. Results of the Ramsey regression 
specification error test (RESET) reject the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted vari-
ables.  
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Conducting these estimations on the two sub-samples shows different patterns: while IP pro-
tection and the level of education are positive and significant in both sub-samples, in industri-
alized countries the availability of financial capital is positive and inflation is negative, and 
significant. In LDCs, the change in demand is positive and significant9 but openness to trade 
is negative and significant. The variable accounting for political instability has not been in-
cluded in the regressions with the industrialized countries sub-sample since though political 
failures do occur in these countries, their extent is most of the time limited and does not affect 
the functioning of the state as is more often the case in LDCs. However, though not signifi-
cant, some coefficients do not present the expected sign, for example the ratio of change in 
GDP is negative for the industrialized country sub-sample, whereas the interest rate presents a 
positive coefficient in the LDC sub –sample.  
Alfranca and Huffman (2003) have found institutional quality to be an important determinant 
of innovation, and the quality of institutions is significantly lower in the LDCs (see table 3). 
Model (2) hence controls for the quality of institutions: the effect of institutional quality could 
otherwise be captured by another variable. Interestingly, the coefficient is positive but not 
significant in all the samples and leaves the other coefficients more or less unchanged. 
Exceptions are the coefficient of inflation in the industrialized country sub-sample, and the 
level of education in the LDC sub-sample, that are now not significantly different from zero. 
The level of human of human capital is highly correlated with the index of institutional qual-
ity (0.5818 correlation for the full sample, 0.5919 for the industrialized country sub-sample, 
and 0.2708 for the LDC sub-sample), hence multicollinearity could explain the lack of sig-
nificance of the coefficients. 
                                                                          
9 The other regressor accounting for demand-pull factors, the size of the population, was not found to be signifi-
cant in any of the regressions and sub-samples, these estimations are hence not presented here. 
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Table 4 Basic Estimations 
 Full  sample  IC  LDC 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 




























































































































































RDSTOCK  -   0.486*** 
(0.130) 
- -  0.664*** 
(0.064) 
- -  0.185 
(0.213) 



















2 0.6189 0.5796  0.7937  0.6204  0.6193 0.9018  0.5385  0.5471  0.6390 


















































Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***: significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. (1): basic estimations; (2): estimations with institutional qual-
ity; (3) estimations with technological capital stock. The list of countries included in each estimation is presented in table 2 in appendix. 
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Finally, the importance of past scientific and technological activities is taken into account 
in model (3). The coefficient in the full sample and for industrialized countries is positive 
and highly significant, as expected, but is not significant in the LDC sub-sample. Given 
the magnitude of investments in R&D, and the level of technological capabilities, past 
R&D investments might play a more important role in industrialized countries than in 
LDCs. The introduction of this regressor has few impacts on the other regressors: for the 
full sample, the political instability dummy is not significant anymore, though still nega-
tive, and the magnitude of the coefficients in the LDC sub-sample is affected, but the 
significance levels are not. For the industrialized countries, the coefficient of the interest 
rate is now significantly different from zero (and still negative) while surprisingly, the 
coefficient on IP protection is now negative, though not significant. Again, the correla-
tion between these two variables is high (0.7086 for industrialized countries), which 
could explain this result. For all three samples, the RESET test does not reject the hy-
pothesis that there is no missing variable in model (3). 
4.2 Missing  Observations 
An important issue is obviously the one of missing observations. For some countries 
(especially LDCs) data points are missing, which reduces the number of countries in-
cluded in the estimations and hence affects their quality. The prevalence of missingness is 
shown in table 5. The total number of countries in the sample could be as high as 98 but 
missing observations bring this figure down to a maximum of 52 countries in the estima-
tions presented in table 4. A complete case analysis, as performed by Kanwar and Even-
son, can lead to substantial efficiency losses (Little and Rubin, 2002), even if the estima-
tor is unbiased when the data is missing completely at random (MCAR).10 One way to 
correct for this problem, under the assumption of MCAR, is multiple imputation. In the 
first step, plausible values for missing observations are created based on the relationship 
observed between the non-missing covariates. These values are then used to complete the 
                                                                          
10 The missing completely at random assumption implies that missingness is not related to any factor, 
known or unknown, in the study. 
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dataset by drawing the missing observations and create m “completed” datasets. The data 
are then analyzed using normal, complete data methods, and the results are combined to 
take the uncertainty of the imputation into account (Horton and Kleinman, 2007). 
Table 5 Percentage of missing values, by sub-sample 
 
Variables IC  LDC 
  Missing (%)  Missing (%) 
RDGDP 25  74 
GDPCAP 2  7 
IP 0  1 
LAG_SAV 19  13 
POP 0  0 
INTRATE 38  53 
EDU 0  15 
INF 16  26 
OPEN 1 7 
INS 25  44 
 
In the present case, the data are more likely to be “missing not at random” (MNAR), 
which means that the missingness depends on unobserved quantities (of outcomes or 
covariates). For example, more observations are missing for LDCs, so the missingness 
pattern could be related to the level of economic or institutional development. In such a 
case, the missingness pattern is nonignorable and cannot be solved with imputation of the 
missing data points; hence a model to address this issue must be developed.  
The situation could be modeled as one in which an incompletely observed variable (Y1 or 
in this case RDGDP) with a linear regression on covariates, is observed if and only if the 
value of another completely unobserved variable (Y2, a country’s reporting capacity in 
this case) exceeds a threshold, for example zero. The model can be formulated as follows 
(Puhani, 2000): 
                                                     ( 3 a )  
                                                     ( 3 b )  
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                                                if  > 0         ( 3 c )  
                                                if  0        (3d) 
where    and   are unobserved, whereas   is observed. It is commonly assumed that   
and   have a bivariate normal distribution: 
                                                       (4) 
Heckman (1979) proposed a method to estimate the inverse of Mill’s ratio ( )  
                                                ( 5 )  
where   is a monotone decreasing function of the probability that an observation is se-
lected into the sample. It is estimated by way of a probit model and is then included into 
equation (6): 
       (6) 
which is the second stage. The sample selection problem is hence treated as a special case 
of the omitted variable problem, with   being the omitted variable if OLS were used on 
the subsample for which   > 0.  
Given that the Hausman tests on the previous estimations always favored random effects 
over fixed effects, I estimate the first step using a probit model with random effects, and 
then use these results to calculate . I then include   as an explanatory variable in the 
second stage regression (run only on the subsample for which   > 0) to control for selec-
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tivity bias. If   is significantly different from zero, there is evidence of a sample selection 
problem.   
Table 6 presents the results. For the selection equation, I hypothesize that the “capacity to 
report” depends on political stability (state failure dummy, POL) and the level of devel-
opment, proxied by GDP per capita. Indeed, both variables are significantly different 
from zero. In the second-stage equation,   is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level, which confirms that there is a sample selection problem. Hence taking into account 
the fact that some countries have a low capacity to report data on innovation, IPRs and 
past R&D investments positively affect R&D investments, while openness to trade nega-
tively affects the performance of innovation. 
However, the Heckman procedure has been criticized, since although it is consistent, it is 
inefficient, and the procedure also introduces a measurement error problem in the second 
stage estimation since an estimate of the expected value of the error term is used. The 
collinearity between the regressors in the first and second stages is especially problem-
atic, which is the reason why the variable accounting for political instability (POL) is not 
used as a regressor in the second stage. Finally, it is not recommended for small samples, 
hence has not been performed on the two sub-samples. Overall, while these are important 
qualifications that should be kept in mind, the evidence provided here of sample selection 
sheds a different light on the importance of the missing data problem, and the need to 
take it into account. 
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Table 6 Heckman Selection Model 
 
1
st Stage   
GDPCAP  0.534*** 
 (0.107) 
POL  0.489*** 
(0.159) 












Robust estimation (RE) 


























Number of observations 





Note: *, **, ***: significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 




5.1  Determinants of Innovation  
Taking into account the sample selection bias does not really affect the results for the 
whole sample. In the original estimations, the strength of IP protection, the level of edu-
cation in the population and past R&D investments were positive and significant factors 
affecting innovation, and openness to trade was significant but negative. These stay un-
changed, except for the level of human capital that is not significant anymore, but the 
magnitude of the significant coefficients has decreased. In the original estimations, a 1% 
increase in IP strength would increase R&D investments by 1.09%, while taking the 
selection bias into account, a 1% increase in IP protection would increase R&D invest-
ments by 1.04%. Therefore, the results obtained with the original estimations – including 
the technological capital stock variable – seem to be reliable. 
Across sub-samples, it is interesting to see that while the technological capital stock is an 
important determinant of innovation in the full sample and in industrialized countries, it 
is not in the LDC sub-sample. This could be explained by the duality of LDC economies, 
or more generally due to the transaction costs hampering the transfer of information 
among firms or from the public to the private sector.  However, it could also be due to 
errors in the data, that could either introduce a bias or increase standard errors. Indeed, 
supplementary regressions (not shown here) including an interaction term between the 
institutional quality index and the technological capital stock do not yield different results 
and the interaction term is not significantly different from zero. Similarly, including also 
the squared technological capital stock as a regressor does not affect other coefficients, 
and its own coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
The demand-pull factors, i.e., the ratio of change in GDP, are only significant in the LDC 
estimations, in all models. Though these estimations are not presented here, the use of the 
size of the population as another measure of demand-pull factors is not significantly dif-
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ferent from zero and does not affect the other coefficients in the different models. How-
ever, the IP protection index is consistently positive and strongly significant, except for 
model (3) for the industrialized country sub-sample. From these results, it is clear that, 
for industrialized countries, once controlling for the quality of institutions and past R&D 
investments, the strength of IP protection is not significant anymore.  
The level of human capital is also positive and significant for the full sample and the 
industrialized country sample, but not for LDCs. Another difference between industrial-
ized and developing countries is exemplified by the coefficient on openness to trade: it is 
negative and consistently significant for LDC estimations, which seems to drive the re-
sults for the whole sample, but it is not significant for the industrialized country regres-
sions. Openness to trade might be supporting innovation in industrialized countries, 
whose technological capacities allow them to take advantage of technology spillovers 
from trade partners. Conversely, the level of technological capabilities amongst firms and 
research institutes in LDCs is in general lower (and more heterogeneous), and they might 
not benefit from spillovers to the same extent. This is supported by empirical evidence 
that R&D spillovers are especially important when countries are trading with trade part-
ners with higher technological capabilities (Coe et al., 1997).  
Overall, my results support the hypothesis that IP protection is a significant and positive 
factor affecting innovation, which is consistent with results from other empirical studies. 
They also lend strong support to the hypothesis that the determinants of innovation are 
different among industrialized and developing countries, which is in line with the find-
ings of recent articles (Higino Schneider, 2005; Hu and Mathews, 2005), even if these 
use different data. However, these results also raise several estimation issues that are 
discussed in the next section. 
5.2 Estimation  Issues 
Several estimation issues need to be taken into account. An important difficulty in identi-
fying the determinants of innovation and, more precisely, attempting to assess the role of 
IP protection, is the correlation among regressors, and more specifically between IP pro-
tection and other regressors. Table 7 presents the pairwise correlations. 
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For the full sample, the correlations between the main regressors are consistently high 
(above 0.40), the exception being the openness variable: it is only correlated with the 
institutional quality index. Not surprisingly, the STATUS variable (dummy indicating a 
developing country) is negatively correlated with most regressors.  
Table 7 Correlations 
 
Full Sample  RDGDP  IP  EDU  GDPCAP  INS  OPEN 
RDGDP  1         
IP 0.7230*  1        
EDU 0.6954*  0.5934*  1      
GDPCAP 0.8400*  0.6548*  0.7713*  1    
INS 0.5978*  0.4820*  0.5818*  0.6278*  1  
OPEN  -0.1556 0.0223  -0.0346 -0.0715 0.2592*  1 
STATUS -0.7612*  -0.5784*  -0.6412*  -0.7962*  -0.5482*  0.2048* 
 
Industrialized Countries 
    
 RDGDP  IP  EDU  GDPCAP  INS  OPEN 
RDGDP  1         
IP 0.6401*  1        
EDU 0.4667*  0.4080*  1      
GDPCAP 0.6763*  0.5473*  0.6072*  1    
INS 0.5427*  0.5381*  0.5967*  0.5141*  1  
OPEN  -0.0220 0.1390  0.1631* 0.2463* 0.2758*  1 
 
Developing Countries 
        
 RDGDP  IP  EDU  GDPCAP  INS  OPEN 
RDGDP  1         
IP 0.2978*  1        
EDU 0.3722*  0.3263*  1      
GDPCAP 0.2233*  0.3161*  0.6447*  1    
INS  0.1144 0.0817  0.2708* 0.3374*  1  
OPEN  -0.1420  0.2010*  0.1247  0.1878*  1  0.4566* 
Note: * significant at the 1% level 
For the sub-samples, the picture is different: in industrialized countries, openness is posi-
tively correlated with the level of education, GDP per capita and institutional quality, and 
all other regressors are highly correlated with another. For LDCs, the correlations are a 
lot weaker. Interestingly, IP protection is positively and significantly correlated with 
openness to trade for LDCs, but not for industrialized countries, which could be due to 
the fact that, for most LDCs, IP strengthening is a result of trade negotiations (Jaffe and 
van Wijk, 1995). This however raises the question of the possible endogeneity of the 
IPRs variable.  
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This is tested using the Durban-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity, a test of the signifi-
cance of the residual variable in the augmented regression, following Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). The results, presented in table 8, show that the IP protection index is 
indeed endogenous for the full sample, as well as for industrialized countries, but not for 
LDCs.  
The parameter estimates are therefore biased. However, addressing the endogeneity prob-
lem requires instrumental variable techniques and the search for appropriate instruments 
– highly correlated with IP protection but not with the error term. Given the high multi-
collinearity among regressors, and the difference in the countries in the sample, finding 
appropriate instruments is very difficult, and weak instruments can lead to misleading 
estimates (Stock et al., 2002). Furthermore, IV estimations tend to increase the variance 
of the estimates. Since the potential gains from IV estimations do not seem to outweigh 
the potential costs, especially given the difficulty in finding appropriate instruments, this 
issue is not addressed. 
Table 8 Durban-Wu-Hausman Tests of Endogeneity  
 
  Full sample  Industrialized countries Developing countries 








Note: ***, ** and * respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Since the goal of this paper is to identify the determinants of innovation, it makes sense 
to look at the direction of the relationship. I perform tests of Granger causality which, 
though they do not test for the “real” causality relationship between two variables, do 
give an indication of the existing temporal relationship.11 The results are presented in 
Table 9.   
Contrary to expectations, past IP strength is not a significant determinant of current R&D 
investments, for the full sample as well as for both sub-samples. On the other hand, past 
R&D investments are highly significant in explaining both current IP strength level and 
current R&D investments, for the full sample and for both sub-samples. This result is 
                                                                          
11 A variable   is Granger causal for   if   helps predict  .  
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consistent with the results of Ginarte and Park (1997) who identify R&D investments as 
an important explanatory factor of the strength of IP protection. 
That past values of R&D investments explain current values of R&D investments (and 
the same for IP protection) is not surprising. However, the fact that past IP protection is 
consistently insignificant in explaining current R&D investments is surprising and should 
be further investigated.  

































































Note: standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.  
5.3  Innovation and IPR: Specific Issues 
Beside estimation issues, specific aspects related to innovation and IPRs also need to be 
taken into account. First, innovation is inherently difficult to define and to measure. Defi-
nitions vary among sources: the systems of innovation literature stays close to Schum-
peter’s “new combinations” by defining innovation as “a new use of pre-existing possi-
bilities and components” (Lundvall, 1992, p. 8) while the OECD (1997) defines it as all 
the scientific, technological, organizational, financial, and commercial activities neces-
sary to create, implement, and market new or improved products or processes. Measuring 
innovation implies focusing on its more technical aspects, and though this issue has been 
discussed in the literature (see for example Griliches, 1994; Stern et al., 2000) the conclu-
sion is that no perfect measure is available. This problem might be even more relevant for 
the case of LDCs, where innovation often consists more of learning, adaptation and imi-
tation, which again would call for a different treatment.  
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A related issue concerns the quality and availability of data on innovation, especially for 
LDCs. As was mentioned, aggregated data on R&D investments were used as a proxy for 
innovation, which, for LDCs, might represent mainly public investments in R&D. This 
could help explain the different determinants of innovation among industrialized and 
developing countries. Though no perfect data source exists for past innovative activities, 
efforts and resources should be allocated to the collection of reliable data in the future. 
Commendable initiatives exist such as RICYT for Latin-American Countries, the Agri-
cultural Science and Technology Indicators of the International Food Policy Research 
Institute, but more such initiatives should be taken, for different sectors. The evidence of 
sample selection confirms the importance of taking the issue of missing observations 
seriously, especially in the perspective of providing reliable analyses for policy-making. 
Furthermore, the role of IPRs varies among industries: IPRs are typically important for 
industries where imitation costs are low compared to R&D costs, such as pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals (see for example Mansfield, 1995a; Mansfield, 1995b).12 For several in-
dustries, patents do not seem to directly support innovation (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et 
al., 1987). Hence, aggregating data at the country level does not take this heterogeneity 
into account and estimates an average effect, which can produce misleading inferences on 
which to develop policy recommendations. However, given the importance of these is-
sues for economic theory and policy, these qualifications should not discourage research 
in this area but rather support the allocation of more efforts and resources to the collec-
tion and analysis of more reliable data. 
6 Conclusion   
This article contributes to the literature on innovation and development by identifying the 
determinants of innovation, and the role of IPRs, in industrialized and developing coun-
                                                                          
12 Mansfield addresses specifically the role IPRs play in deciding whether or not to transfer technology 
abroad. Foreign direct investments and technology spillovers are not addressed here since they usually do 
not play an important role for local innovation in LDCs (see Aitken and Harrison, 1999 and Hanson, 2001). 
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tries. Using a new dataset, I control for the quality of institutions, past R&D activities, 
and address the issue of missing observations.  
I find that past R&D investments are positive and significant, and that the data are not 
missing at random: there is a sample selection problem. Controlling for this selection 
bias, I find that the level of IP protection and past R&D investments are positive and 
significant regressors explaining R&D investments, while openness to trade has a nega-
tive effect on the full sample. The picture is different when looking at the sub-samples: in 
industrialized countries, past R&D investments and human capital are positive and sig-
nificant factors affecting R&D investments while the cost of capital is negative. Con-
versely, in LDCs past R&D investments do not play a role: IP strength and demand-pull 
factors are positive and significant while openness to trade is negative and significant. 
Hence the determinants of innovation seem to be different for industrialized and develop-
ing countries. This is supported by the endogeneity tests that show that IP protection is 
endogenous in industrialized countries, but not in LDCs. However, in both sub-samples, 
past R&D investments Granger-cause current IP protection levels, but IP protection does 
not Granger-cause R&D investments. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that IP protection supports innovation is not supported by my 
results: while IP protection and R&D investments are obviously correlated, the causal 
relationship would actually go in the other direction (i.e., from R&D to IP protection). 
However, the second hypothesis is supported by the results: the determinants of innova-
tion do differ between industrialized and developing countries. 
These results have important implications, in several respects. First, more attention needs 
to be given to missing data and their analysis. Policy-making based on complete case 
analysis actually included a small sub-set of countries, from industrialized countries and 
the more advanced LDCs – not necessarily a representative sample.  
Additionally more efforts and resources should be allocated to the collection and analysis 
of reliable data on innovation, preferably at the industry level, to take the heterogeneity of 
innovation into account. Moreover, given the several issues plaguing the econometric 
analysis – the lack of data, multicollinearity, endogeneity – case studies or comparative 
studies at the industry level on this issue might be more informative. Finally, these results 
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Appendix 
Table 10 List of countries in each regression 
 
Estimation 1  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. 
Argentina, Brazil, Burundi, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Niger, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Estimation 2  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. 
Argentina, Brazil, Burundi, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Niger, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
Estimation 3  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, 
Niger, Panama, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
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